The recall of elected officeholders the growing incidence of a venerable,but overlooked,democratic institution

Scattered case studies of recall procedures can be found in the literature on particular countries, and recent literature has drawn attention to the growth and diffusion of this family of practices. But the long genealogy, and the wide international distribution, of the recall process has been overlooked in the broader study of democratization, institutional design, and political representation. This article presents the two original country studies and situates them within the emerging field of comparative research. Four major themes are highlighted: the multiple and often subterranean sources of these experiments; their fluctuating profiles and (mostly) low external visibility; the relative weight of diffusion versus independent invention; and the resulting design pitfalls, as well as the potential benefits when carefully introduced.     

Interest groups and policy volatility

We offer a model of how interest groups affect policy stability. The relationship between interest group density and policy volatility is concave because of two forces: (a) the number and interaction of interest groups in a policy domain and (b) the effect of this interaction on policy image and attention. After laying out the logics of both processes, we identify three ideal type situations: (a) capture (low interest group density, low attention) and (b) deadlock (high interest group density, high attention) lead to low levels of policy volatility while (c) lability (medium interest group density, intermittent attention) leads to high levels of policy volatility. For our empirical evidence, we rely on all budget functions in the American states from 1984 to 2010 and employ generalized additive regression modeling. The article contributes to the literature on understanding interest group strategies, interest group influence in policy making, and broader questions of deliberative democracy.     

Does the Ideological Proximity Between Candidates and Voters Affect Voting in U.S. House Elections?

Do citizens hold congressional candidates accountable for their policy positions? Recent studies reach different conclusions on this important question. In line with the predictions of spatial voting theory, a number of recent survey-based studies have found reassuring evidence that voters choose the candidate with the most spatially proximate policy positions. In contrast, most electoral studies find that candidates’ ideological moderation has only a small association with vote margins, especially in the modern, polarized Congress. We bring clarity to these discordant findings using the largest dataset to date of voting behavior in congressional elections. We find that the ideological positions of congressional candidates have only a small association with citizens’ voting behavior. Instead, citizens cast their votes “as if” based on proximity to parties rather than individual candidates. The modest degree of candidate-centered spatial voting in recent Congressional elections may help explain the polarization and lack of responsiveness in the contemporary Congress.     

Lies Matter

Law and Philosophy -     

Ideological Motives in Spoiler Violence: Postconflict Assam,Northeast India

Spoilers of peace agreements are normally seen as motivated by utility maximization, their actions intended to gain a larger proportion of postconflict political power or economic wealth. In this article, I examine this perspective via a comparative analysis of two cases of spoiler violence in Assam, India, one involving a spoiler excluded from the agreement and the other a spoiler central to the peace process and the postconflict political and economic milieu. Both cases suggest that some spoiling action following peace agreements is less instrumental and driven more by emotional and ideological phenomena than this leading understanding suggests.     

Fiscal Austerity and Rental Housing Policy in the United States and United Kingdom, 2010–2016

After the 2008 global financial crisis, both the United States and the United Kingdom introduced austerity policies targeted at particular elements of their national budgets. The purpose of this article is to compare the nature of this retrenchment; the similarities and differences in how it was implemented; and its initial impacts on one of the expenditure areas particularly affected: affordable rental housing programs and housing support for low-income households. Using a wide range of data sources, we find evidence of political and fiscal policy analogies in the timing and forms of the initial policy choices and how these were modified in the face of economic and political pressures. There are considerable similarities both in the instruments used to reduce housing expenditures and in the early impacts on support mechanisms and recipients. However, we find different histories and trajectories of support between the two countries that suggest that the longer term differences in outcomes may be more important.